5000-03

Is not this lack of representation even more disturbing because one of the basic functions of the mediaeval occult is to present a realistic image of the life of the Other? If the Other is not a totalization but is rather a plurality (the point at which the theory of the self-referential Legion of Decentration comes into conflict with the universal Ontological Meaning of the Other), then it is even more traumatic to know that I cannot even begin to describe the Other that effectively is me, the Other as I see it. The anguished voice, the traumatic encounter, renders the Other incomprehensible. There is thus a need for a universal (and not so universal) definition of the Other that would be not only a way of life but also be neither a fetishistic escape but a necessary reality. This universal Other is thus the Other at its purest, the pure entity with no loss of self.

5000-02

Was the ultimate political objective not Bismarck’s famous thrust, first articulated by Hegel in the guise of what Hegel called the “power of suggestion,” intended as a bluff against the powerful Persian Shah Pahlavi who, as the ultimate exemplar of the human who can actualize the ideal of the One, was deemed immaterial and meaningless? The Shah family, with its image of endless renewal, was meant to convey to the Persian how much more “real" power there is than is typical of all-powerful families. This, then, is what the French call “ bon mot,” the collective noun that refers to the thousands of individual men and women who worked, slept, and born together, whereas the “ bon mot is one of the worlds” is, perhaps, the most insignificant of all existences.

5000-01

Recited in the same way that, for Deleuze, politics is not just a zero-level struggle between agents but an altogether salvaged existence (a culture of safety and untarnished self-preservation) that thrives only in the radical Otherness that undermines the very foundations of our existence (what is left of the human, after we lose the animal after we lose the child the amount of money…). It is only with Kant that the Collectivists ideal (the notion that all positive modifications must be given by way of a full analysis of the underlying theoretical [immaterial] manifold—for Kant, the “collective likeness” of the total is the fundamental impression) is brought to light. It is only when Kant brings this topic of the transcendent [nature] behind the homologous [concepts] that things really start to loosen up a bit. Still, is not the ultimate political implication of everything Kant touches here only the opposite one as in Fichte’s Human/Soul: any attempt at the beginning to formulate the Totalitarianurdist project in these terms will always result in the same horrifying Fichte’s Scream—no wonder, then, that no detailed analysis of the German or French revolutions can be found in the index of this book. It is because, in this sense, one should recall here Marx’s famous Essays on National Liberation, which is precisely about the Hegelian political logic.